Solidarity Action in Global Labor Networks. Four Cases of Workplace Organizing at Foreign Affiliates in the Global South by Wad, Peter
11
Nordic journal of working life studies Volume 4  ❚  Number 1  ❚  February 2014
Solidarity Action in Global Labor Networks. Four 
Cases of Workplace Organizing at Foreign Affiliates 
in the Global South
Peter Wad❚❚ 1
Associate professor, Department of Intercultural Communication and Management, Copenhagen 
Business School, Denmark 
ABSTRACT
Globalization transforms workforces of transnational corporation from predominantly home country-
dominated workforces into foreign-dominated, multinational workforces.  Thus, the national grounding 
of trade unions as the key form of labor organizing is challenged by new multinational compositions 
and cross-border relocations of corporate employment affecting working conditions of employees 
and trade unions in local places.  We assume that economic globalization is characterized by ex-
panding global corporate network of vertically and horizontally integrated (equity-based) and disin-
tegrated (nonequity-based) value chains.  We also assume that globalization can both impede and 
enable labor empowerment.  Based on these premises the key question is, how can labor leverage 
effective power against management in global corporate networks?  This question is split into two 
subquestions: a) How can labor theoretically reorganize from national unions and industrial rela-
tions institutions into global labor networks that allow prolabor improvement in global workplaces?  
b) How and why has labor in a globalized economy secured the core International Labor Or-
ganization (ILO) international labor right to organize companies and conduct collective bargain-
ing?  The Global Labor Network perspective is adopted as an analytical framework. Empirically, a 
comparative case methodology is applied comprising four more or less successful industrial disputes 
where labor achieved the right to organize and undertake collective bargaining.  The disputes took 
place in affiliated factories of foreign transnational corporations located in Malaysia, the Philippines,  
Sri Lanka, and Turkey.  The conclusion is that the combination of global labor capabilities and global 
labor strategizing must generate strategic labor power that adequately matches the weaknesses of 
the counterpart’s global corporate network in order to achieve prolabor outcomes.  The most efficient 
solidarity action was leveraged by a cross-border alliance of workplace collectives, national industrial 
unions, and a global union federation using global framework agreements (GFAs) with key customers 
of the employer.  The least efficient campaign relied primarily on domestic developing country state 
institutions supported by a foreign labor nongovernmental organization (NGO). 
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Introduction
With increasing internationalization and globalization of production, trade, financ-ing, and information flows, corporations and workplaces are becoming more and more complex and ‘denationalized.’ The workforce of the most internationalized 
transnational corporations (TNCs) is overwhelmingly ‘foreign’ relative to the home of 
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the headquarters and its traditional domestic base. The most internationalized multina-
tional companies employed more people abroad than at home in the 2000s compared 
with 1995 (UNCTAD various years). According to industry, the vast oil TNCs seemed 
to have reached the foreign employment ceiling in the 2000s while most giant motor 
vehicle TNCs have steadily increased their offshore employment base over time. Toyota 
Motor Corp. reached a global workforce with nearly 50 percent foreign employees in 
2000 (calculated from Shimizu 2003, 135, 142). Countrywise, the same trend is ob-
served. For example, Danish firms with subsidiaries abroad employ nearly 1.27 million 
offshore in 2011 and foreign TNC subsidiaries employed more than 270,000 employ-
ees in Denmark (2010). With a total Danish private labor force of around 1.3 million 
employees in 2011, Danish firms employ nearly the same amount of people abroad as 
at home. In addition, 20% of Danish private sector employees are employed by foreign 
companies (Denmark’s Statistics 2013).
The trend of transnationalized corporate workforces challenges once again the na-
tionally constituted trade unions, whether they are craft-, industry-, or occupation-based 
organizations. These unions cannot operate effectively and efficiently within national 
borders when their counterpart of employers and corporate managers operate cross-
border businesses. Management reconfigures their global value chains in line with per-
ceived comparative and competitive advantages and captures surplus value wherever 
they prefer, e.g., in tax havens. Thus, contemporary corporate offshoring and outsourc-
ing of production and service activities question the bargaining power of nationally 
constituted unions. This transformation of corporate employment adds to the ongoing 
weakening of organized labor in terms of declining union density, erosion of unions’ 
power at the labor market and workplaces, and their political salience. No wonder that 
the wage share of functional income distribution has declined in advanced countries as 
well as developing countries in recent years (Stockhammer 2012).
We assume that economic globalization is characterized by expanding global corpo-
rate network of vertically and horizontally integrated (equity-based) and disintegrated 
(nonequity-based) value chains (Dicken 2011; UNCTAD 2013). We also assume that 
globalization can both impede and enable labor empowerment (Wills 1998). The key 
question is the following: How can labor leverage effective power against management 
in global corporate networks? This question is split into two subquestions: a) How can 
labor theoretically reorganize from national unions and industrial relations institutions 
into global labor networks that allow prolabor improvement in global workplaces? 
b) How and why has labor in a globalized economy secured the core international labor 
right to organize companies and conduct collective bargaining?
Regarding the first subquestion, our claim is that in a context of expanding global 
corporate networks governed by TNCs, enterprise-based labor networking across borders 
is vital to effectuate labor improvements in global industries. The reason is that TNCs 
govern their global reach, mobility and value creation, distribution and capture both in 
equity-based business networks and in nonequity-based transactions. Labor must there-
fore be able to organize intra-corporate as well as inter- and extra-corporate cross-border 
networks that can reregulate the flow of values in order to obtain an acceptable social 
share of collectively generated value added. Such global labor networks can potentially 
identify and pressure TNCs on their weak positions in order to engage decision-makers 
in collective negotiations and problem solving. But intra-corporate labor networks alone 
are probably not sufficient to secure prolabor outcomes of industrial disputes.
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The success or failure of global labor networks is also tightly knit with national 
industrial relations legislation and administration. Trade unions are mostly constituted 
as national organizations within industry, craft, or occupational labor market segment, 
with the exception of Japan, South Korea, and Chile among Organisation for Economic 
Cooperation and Development (OECD) countries today. Restructuring nation-based 
unions into global labor networks of trade unions and worker collectives may cause 
union leaders to feel loss of ‘sovereignty,’ and rank-and-file employees may lose sense 
of trade unionism. Employees of TNCs may not understand or care about the global 
foundation and external vulnerability of their local workplaces. 
Regarding the second subquestion, we ask for an empirical analysis of the actual 
distribution and change of TNC compliance with the international labor right to orga-
nize and collectively bargain agreements with employers. This right is considered a core 
labor right (Convention 98) by the ILO. It is a so-called ‘enabling right’ because it allows 
building and sustaining workplace labor power and thus enables marginalized labor to 
take part in the intra-corporate bargaining over collectively generated values. To an-
swer the subquestion a comparative case methodology is applied analyzing four more 
or less successful industrial disputes and labor campaigns about the right to organize 
and undertake collective bargaining from a worker collective perspective. The disputes 
took place at affiliated factories of foreign TNCs in Malaysia (Wad 2007, 2013), the 
Philippines (Wad & Tackney 2011), Sri Lanka (Egels-Zandén & Hyllman 2006, 2007), 
and Turkey (IndustriALL 2013). Three of the case studies are based on empirical 
evidence delivered by the author and other social researchers while the fourth case study 
is known from the union press only and is thus based on partial evidence.
The article proceeds in the following way. The next section outlines our theoretical 
perspective capturing the problem area of corporate globalization transcending national 
borders of trade union power and how trade unions can bridge the gap between TNC’s 
global operations and trade unions’ nationally confined collective actions. Then, the four 
cases are presented outlining the key features of the industrial disputes between Northern 
TNCs and Southern trade unions. The case presentations are summarized before they are 
compared and the findings of the multiple case study are discussed in order to explain 
why some concerted labor efforts succeed and others fail. This enables us to identify the 
types of global labor networks in context that are necessary and/or sufficient to conduct 
effective cross-border campaigns making TNCs to comply with ILO Convention 98. The 
last section concludes the article and outlines limitations of the analysis and options for 
future research. 
Labor organizing in global production networks: a theoretical outline
The key assumption about labor organizing within and across global production networks 
is that such global labor networks have to comprehend several levels at the same time and 
be flexible enough to enable upscaling and downscaling according to the situation. Thus, 
labor action targeting local problems in global production networks must at the same time 
involve local union capabilities and mobilize global union and nonunion allies targeting 
and pressuring corporate headquarters where the final decisions are made and sustained. 
Whether global labor networks of global unions, national unions, and workplace 
union activists are strong enough to enter and conclude agreements with TNCs about 
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industrial disputes, for example, over international labor rights, is assumed to be a mat-
ter of strategic analysis, union capacity, and adequate collective action (campaigning) 
based on union or multistakeholder coalitions. Reviewing literatures of Global Value 
Chains, Global Production Networks, and Labor Geography and integrating key under-
standings from the Union Strategic Corporate Analysis (Bronfenbrenner 2007; Juravich 
2007; Juravich & Bronfenbrenner 1999, 2003) and the Strategic Choice Framework 
(Weil 2005), the author (Wad 2013) construed a Global Labor Network perspective. 
The aim was to analyze the relationship between union strategic corporate campaigns 
and unions’ capabilities to implement them effectively, thus integrating existing ap-
proaches and enable union strategic analysis beyond the context of the US labor market 
crossing the divide of Global North and Global South.
The Global Labor Network approach relies on two analytic components for 
effective global collective action by labor: a) the labor strategy for corporate industrial 
relations transformation including the deliberately designed and/or practiced campaign 
to accomplish the specific labor objectives, and b) the capability of the global labor 
network to pressure vulnerable nodes and relations of the global corporation to the 
extent that corporate headquarters and local management give in, negotiate, and con-
clude an agreement that settles the dispute and accomplishes the objective of the labor 
campaign.
The core concept, labor network, is defined as the more or less informal or formal, 
temporary or institutionalized relationships between, on the one hand, employees in 
workplace collectives or labor organizations and, on the other hand, other labor groups 
and/or nonlabor groups that align (in solidarity) with the cause of the focal labor actor. 
The concept of global labor networks comprises cross-border labor networks bridging 
the divide of Global North and Global South. Such networks can be described in terms 
of depth (form and intensity of interaction), scope (social domains or arenas of action), 
and geographical scale (moving vertically from workplace to local, regional, national, 
macroregional, and global union networks, or horizontally at the same vertical level 
across space). Labor strategy is a more or less deliberate articulation (discourse) of labor 
agency defined by its vision, intent, or target of the focal labor group, combined with an 
outline of the means and methods to be applied. Over time, a strategy evolves through 
an ongoing learning process of operational choices informed by conceived strategy and 
experiences while adapting means and eventual ends to the perceived and changing re-
sources and capabilities available. Thus, the process of strategizing involves much more 
than just executing a strategic blue print. Formulating and executing such a strategy 
successfully depends on the capacity of the labor collective, including its competences, 
resources, organization, and networks. 
To be effective a strategy must be translated into a campaign, or defined as a project 
or a series of collective actions that have an effect relative to its objectives as well as a 
wider impact on the collective and its environment. To be efficient, the strategy must 
do so in a relatively shorter time using less resources. A successful campaign accom-
plishes the focal objectives and can simultaneously improve (or weaken) labor capacity 
and capability (power) and/or the employment conditions of union members (employee 
benefits) depending on the objectives of the campaign and the resources mobilized, en-
hanced, or destroyed. In sum, the concept of labor agency (power in action) is defined 
as the capability of labor with institutional and value chain leverage to target and pro-
mote corporate decision-making in favor of the objectives of the labor campaign, for 
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example, empowerment of labor through management recognition of the employees’ 
chosen union. 
This way of theorizing global labor agency assumes that the core structural context 
of the focal labor agency (object of research) is the global corporate network embed-
ding the management–labor dispute at the microlevel (workplace). A global corporate 
network can be composed of several global value chains that can be productively related 
(vertically connected) or unrelated (horizontally) in terms of global value chains but 
linked through equity, contract, or information. Understood in terms of process, the 
focal labor agency will be spatially fixed in place and evolve in scale and time at and 
across single or multiple levels of workplace, locale, province, nation, region, and world, 
scaling up, scaling down, or rescaling horizontally or vertically. 
The overarching concept of strategic power is defined by the combined labor ca-
pability and strategic opportunity. Labor capability is the available organizational or 
network capacity and competence and it may turn into a dynamic capability with learn-
ing. Strategic opportunity is defined by the weaknesses and vulnerabilities of corporate 
power due to key institutional and value chain relations that can affect centers of profit-
ability or growth negatively or reduce corporate reputation and thereby impact corpo-
rate headquarters to make prolabor decisions. The overall strategic power of the global 
labor network is the confluence of all these mechanisms of influence enacted in time and 
place within the domain of the global labor networks, which elicits the ultimate decision 
resolving the industrial dispute in favor of labor objectives. Therefore, chains of equity, 
or capital ownership and control in other words, and management hierarchy and leader-
ship are extremely important for global labor agency. Yet, this dimension has often been 
marginalized in global value chain analysis and especially in buyer-driven global value 
chains where inter-firm transactions are governed through nonequity forms of power, 
for example, certification and quality standards. But it is a pertinent issue known as 
supply chain responsibility. 
Global corporations are often conglomerates or business groups like Danish 
APM-Maersk and they bundle related or unrelated global value chains, forming glob-
al corporate networks. New global value chain options for labor influence may be 
structurally available outside the global value chain where the focal workplace/local 
company is located due to global corporate ownership or chains of capital. Strategic 
labor opportunities may also change over time, for example, due to mergers or acquisi-
tions of corporate assets which may reposition the local company and workplace from 
a nongrowth center to a growth center.
The Global Labor Network analysis aims to explain the effects and impact of the 
labor campaign in terms of campaign characteristics and the total strategic power ex-
ercised during the campaign. Following a Union Strategic Corporate Analysis (Juravich 
2007) one proposition is that comprehensive campaigns have greater likelihood of suc-
cess than noncomprehensive or traditional campaigns. The argument is that such cam-
paigns against TNCs are more effective because they target and hit nodes of the TNC 
network that affect profit or growth centers negatively, compared with traditional cam-
paign of direct action against the employer and company of the focal worker collective. 
Following the Strategic Choice Framework (Weil 2005) a second proposition reads that 
adequate adjustment of union strategy and organizational tactics to union capacity over 
time will increase the probability of success. Following global value chain and global 
production network thinking (Coe et al. 2008; Cumbers et al. 2008; Riisgaard 2009), a 
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third proposition is that global labor campaigns will be more effective when the domain 
of the global labor network adequately matches to strike most vulnerable points within 
the global power network that affects the lead firms governing the global value chain 
primarily through corporate standards. Following Labor Geography thinking (Castree 
2007) a fourth proposition is that scaling up and down horizontally and vertically is 
critical to overcome resistance by global capital and that labor scaling tactics depend 
on sustained local and workplace labor interest, articulation, understanding, and orga-
nizational capability. A fifth proposition and key to the Global Labor Network perspec-
tive is that global labor campaigns succeed to the degree that the strategic power and 
applied network capabilities are coherently and adequately matching the power of the 
corporate network of the capital counterpart. Thus, this proposition integrates the first 
four propositions in the strategic power perspective of the fifth proposition. A corollary 
to the fifth proposition is that cross-border workplace labor networking is necessary to 
achieve an effective power match with management of corporations with transnational-
ized workforces. 
In sum, the rationale of the Global Labor Network framework can be depicted in a 
simplified manner leaving out feedback effects except the response of corporate manage-
ment to the labor claim (Figure 1). 
Figure 1: Dynamics of Global Labor Network (arrows illustrate select flows of potential influence).
Bold arrows = dimensions of framework structure anchored in space and time and composed of social mechanisms 
linking labor, capital, and institutions. Red arrows = labor-driven processes. Blue arrows: institution-linked processes. 
Black arrows = capital-linked processes.
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Explanatory note: The analysis is focused on a specific labor–management dispute that 
is located in time and space in a particular workplace embedded in a structure of global 
corporate, labor, and societal networks and institutions. This structure comprises a set 
of social mechanisms that can be triggered or blocked by, for example, managerial and 
labor actors. An example: An industrial dispute begins with contradicting claims from a 
worker collective and management, which makes the labor actor sending its claim to the 
local industrial relations institution. Approached by the institution the management rejects 
the claim and the institution accepts it. The labor actor calls upon the judiciary system of 
industrial courts and civilian courts. Moreover, along the way the labor actor contacts for-
eign labor actors in the country where the company’s mother corporation is headquartered 
(HQs). The foreign labor ally takes the case to an international organization which makes 
the case public in the home country of the corporation and threatens its reputation. The 
top management of the corporation decides to comply with the claim of the local work-
ers’ collective in the affiliated company acknowledging that this company is a core profit 
center within the corporation’s global value chain. 
Comparative cases of industrial disputes
The analysis of the four industrial disputes entails a description of the key features 
of the industrial conflict, including the (work)place of the labor–management contest 
(country of focal workplace), local labor and capital actors of the workplace, substance 
of the dispute (labor rights suppressed), ultimate corporate decision maker (corporate 
HQs), labor campaign (degree of comprehensiveness), and outcome of the campaign 
(success or failure obtaining key labor demands). In order to compare ‘apple with ap-
ple,’ the industrial disputes are all about the (managerially denied) labor right to orga-
nize and collective bargaining at a specific foreign-controlled workplace in a developing 
country. Moreover, most of the cases are clear success stories, and the exception can 
be interpreted as a failure or a success depending on the viewpoint taken. All cases 
involve cross-border campaigning, but otherwise the cases and their context vary in 
several ways, for example, in Industrial Relations context, industrial activity, organiza-
tional structure of labor actors, global labor networks, state and nonstate institutions 
mobilized by labor campaign, etc. Thus, the design of the comparison aims following 
the logic of the ‘most different systems’ design (Pennings et al. 1999; Wad 2000), iden-
tifying (unique) patterns of similarity between type of labor campaigning and contexts 
(independent factors) and similar outcomes (dependent factor) while keeping options 
open for deeper mechanisms mediating ‘global labor network’ capability and strategic 
power into global labor practices and results. In practice, the ‘method of concomitant 
variation’ was applied because the quality of the dependent and independent factors 
varied although the dependent outcome could be defined as a labor success because 
the employer complied to the labor claim for unionizing and collective negotiations. 
While the most different system’s approach lacks the opportunity to compare ‘similar 
patterns’ (experimental cases) with ‘different patterns’ (control cases), this is partly 
possible with the design of ‘concomitant variation.’ Yet, the comparison concerns de-
grees of ‘campaign success’ and degrees of ‘campaign comprehensiveness,’ and it miss-
es out on strict cases of campaign failure and on prolabor success with traditional 
campaigning (counterfactual cases). Finally, we follow a research approach of critical 
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realist retroduction aiming for theory development of Global Labor Networking 
through comparing, contrasting, adjustment, and elaboration of theory and empirical 
evidence acknowledging that causality is attributed by theoretical reasons, not induc-
tively inferred from experimental experience (Wad 2012b). 
Recalling our theory the argument is that an effective global labor strategy (global 
comprehensive labor campaign) must trigger social mechanisms that put pressure on 
TNC HQs through its global production network of global value chains and institu-
tional linkages to the point where the corporate HQs give in to labor demands. How do 
our cases of industrial dispute and labor campaigning from the Philippines, Malaysia, 
Sri Lanka, and Turkey fit our Global Labor Network theory? Given that the two cases 
from Malaysia and Sri Lanka reflecting semicomprehensive campaigns are taken to be 
clear successes, the evidence seems to partially falsify our first theoretical proposition 
that labor success is caused by comprehensive campaigns. But is this judgment sustained 
by the fuzzy Philippine case if considered from the workplace collective’s perspective 
claiming organizing and bargaining rights? While the first trade union failed to obtain 
recognition from management, an alternative trade union achieved recognition and col-
lective agreement without conducting any global campaign! Given that the Turkey case 
seems to follow the core proposition presenting a comprehensive global campaign and 
a positive result, the core proposition of the theory seems to be corroborated positively, 
and so it does if the Philippine case is considered a failure taking the first legitimate 
union perspective. In sum, we need to dig deeper to try to resolve these contradicting 
findings and interpretations.
We start with the fuzzy case from the Philippines and end the case presentation with 
the most effective and time-efficient labor campaign from Turkey.
The case of the Philippine industrial dispute
Toyota Motor Corporation (TMC) returned to the Philippines in 1989 establishing the 
Toyota Motor Philippine Corporation (TMPC) assembling motor vehicles for the small 
Philippine market and organizing among other things a Labor–Management Council for 
consultation between management and labor represented by supervisors (Haruhi 2006). 
After several attempts to form an independent enterprise union, the Toyota Motor Phil-
ippine Corporation Workers Association (TMPCWA, the first union) was registered in 
1998 as a union for rank-and-file employees claiming bargaining rights, which was ac-
corded by the labor authorities in 2001. When the management refused to engage with 
the union after union certification, the union staged a strike. The management put pres-
sure on the Philippine authorities that ordered the union members back to work and the 
union followed the directive. Declaring the strike illegal, the management dismissed 233 
employees out of approximately 1,450 (Shimizu 2003, 142) including union officials. 
Although the Supreme Court of the Philippines in 2003 declared that the management 
should start collective bargaining with the union, the management refused both to nego-
tiate and to reinstate the dismissed employees. 
The union mobilized and received support from civil society groups and labor or-
ganizations in the Philippines. It collaborated with the nongovernmental organization 
(NGO), Young Christian Workers of the Philippines, which supported the union during 
the first certification election process in 2000–01. It sought support from other unions and 
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social movements from 2003–04, like ‘Solidarity of Workers in Southern Tagalog Region’ 
including the ‘Alliance of Workers in the Enclave’ and the Coalition of ‘Auto Workers and 
Related Industries Against Imperialist Domination’ (Haruhi 2006, 267). This networking 
translated into a concerted local campaign by the union in collaboration with the Metal 
Workers Alliance of the Philippines. These organizations conducted demonstrations, such 
as the one in front of the Japanese Embassy in September 2006 protesting “the anti-work-
er policy of the Japanese transnational company, Toyota” (Wad & Tackney 2011).
The union not only mobilized supporters in the Philippines but took the campaign 
to Japan and complaint to the ILO and the International Metalworkers Federation 
(IMF) in 2003. In Japan the union was supported by an NGO, ‘Support Group for 
TMPCWA,’ including NGOs and alternative industrial union federations like the All 
Japan Shipbuilding and Engineering Union to which the union became affiliated in 2004 
in an attempt to pressure Toyota into direct negotiations. A complaint was filed with the 
OECD National Contact Point-Japan. Such contact points were established by OECD 
as multistakeholder forums administered nationally with the purpose of monitoring the 
OECD Code of Conduct for Multinational Enterprises. The complaint was buried by 
the Japanese agency and has never been processed properly. 
The complaint to the ILO was processed, and ILO recommended the Philippine 
government to reconsider the case. The ILO support was a wake-up call for the glob-
al union, International Metalworkers Federation that tried to mediate via the Toyota 
Motor Corporation Union. When this failed, the global union initiated a worldwide 
campaign “Reinstate Them Now” in 2006, again without getting any concessions from 
Toyota. On the contrary, in 2010 four members of the Philippine union were dismissed. 
However, the global union later initiated meetings among its affiliates in the Philippines 
in order to build stronger union collaboration reducing the negative impact of high 
union fragmentation.
Meanwhile a second rank-and-file enterprise union, Toyota Motor Philippine 
Corporation Labor Organization (TMPCLO, the second union), was established in 
2001 after the mass dismissals and joined the Labor–Management Council together 
with the supervisors’ enterprise union. The second union achieved majority votes in a 
new, second certification process in 2006 in competition with the first union. This certi-
fication was conducted in accordance with Philippine industrial relations law allowing 
for replication of union certification after five years (Erickson et al. 2003), but it 
excluded the more than 200 dismissed members.
In sum, the first enterprise union lost the battle with Toyota, and a quarter of the 
rank-and-file workforce was expelled and substituted by new irregular and regular em-
ployees. A second union was formed and included in the labor–management institution, 
won the second rank-and-file union certification election, and concluded a collective 
agreement with the management. From a workforce perspective, the worker collective 
achieved union recognition through the second union and the first collective agreement 
with the employer. From the legitimate first union perspective, the member base was 
downsized and the workplace collective transformed by the employer. The campaign by 
the first union has so far been a failure as it has not obtained recognition from Toyota. 
The negative outcome for the first union and the positive one for the second union are 
generated after the first union conducted a semicomprehensive campaign mobilizing 
support from many corners and scales, except from TMC and its enterprise union that 
acknowledged the CLO as a legitimate and responsible union of the TMPC workers. 
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The case of the Malaysian industrial dispute
The company, Euromedical Industries (or Euromedical), was established in 1975 as a 
joint venture between foreign majority and state minority capital in the Malaysian state 
of Kedah close to Penang with the purpose to produce rubber- and plastic-based medical 
equipment for export. Immediately, the predominantly female worker collective applied 
for unionization, but as per Malaysian industrial relations legislation the authorities 
should approve the match between unions’ jurisdiction and the workplace in question. 
Only in 1983 the National Union of Employees in Companies Manufacturing Rub-
ber Products (NUECMRP, or Rubber Union) was recognized as the appropriate union 
and was thus entitled to claim majority membership support and call the employer for 
collective bargaining. This process dragged on due to legal disputes in the industrial 
relations system and the civil court system and to management’s attempt to form an 
in-house union. When the authorities finally certified the Rubber Union as the single 
representative industrial union of Euromedical’s rank-and-file workforce in 1993, the 
management successfully challenged the authorities’ decision in the local civil court only 
to be followed by an appeal to the Court of Appeal by the authorities in alliance with 
the Rubber Union which was won in 1998. This outcome made the management file the 
case with the Federal Court before losing definitively in 2004. The management recog-
nized the Rubber Union in 2005 and the first collective agreement was concluded for 
the three years 2007–2010. 
Meanwhile Euromedical had shifted majority ownership among foreign corporations 
several times. In 1998 the largest Danish TNC, APM-Maersk, acquired a controlling share 
in its attempt to build a strong medical product division, Maersk Medical. Soon after, the 
APM-Maersk Group decided anyway to divest its manufacturing activities, focusing its 
core business on container shipping and oil/gas exploration, while keeping a strong inter-
est in retail business. The Euromedical management did not change policy on the issue 
of union recognition, and by the end of 2001 it decided to cancel the traditional annual 
bonus due to slack business performance. The workers started a wild-cat strike in protest 
and the management retaliated by suspending dozens of workers and finally dismissing 
four union activists in 2002. 
Given the Danish variety of coordinated market capitalism building on strong na-
tional industrial relations system of collective organizing, collective bargaining, and 
conflict resolution, union harassment was unexpected by the management of a Danish-
controlled affiliate with cordial relations to unions in Denmark. But more was in the 
pipeline. Danish unionists had visited Euromedical and met Malaysian union activists 
and workers in 2001 before the wild-cat strike, and they had tried to persuade the local 
management and the Maersk Medical division headquarters in Denmark to recognize 
the Rubber Union and conclude a collective agreement, in vain. When they were in-
formed about the issues of annual bonus, strike, suspension, and dismissals, the local 
chapter of the Danish labor NGO (Labor Movement’s International Forum) initiated a 
campaign (“The Mouse and the Elephant”) to challenge APM-Maersk’s violations of 
international labor rights in Malaysia.
The labor NGO took responsibility for mobilizing Danish support for the 
Malaysian workers after consulting the relevant trade unions, the Danish Federation of 
Female Workers and the peak labor union, Danish LO. The Danish unions would not 
risk jeopardizing their good relationship with APM-Maersk in Denmark on behalf of 
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“some women in Malaysia” (Wad 2007, 56), but they supported the campaign finan-
cially and logistically. The campaign used traditional methods of street agitation, flyers, 
posters, newspaper information, as well as innovative methods like shareholder activ-
ism at the annual APM-Maersk general meeting and complaining to the new OECD 
National Contact Point-Denmark. The OECD complaint was the first one launched in 
Denmark and first to be blamed was the Danish corporate giant which took pride in 
its corporate reputation. Tense interaction followed between the local OECD agency, 
Maersk Medical, union activists, and labor politicians, and mistaken use of union note-
paper for the local labor NGO’s complaint to the OECD Contact Point increased the 
suspicion of APM-Maersk that the Danish unions supported the initiative.
APM-Maersk divested its shares in Euromedical in 2002. The company was sold 
together with the rest of the Maersk Medical division to the Swedish-controlled private 
equity company, Nordic Capital, that wanted to create a strong medical group (Uno-
medical headquartered in Denmark) before spinning it off after some years. The OECD 
case was transferred to the new owner that promised to follow the result of Malay-
sian legal process. When it came in 2004 and sustained the right of Rubber Union to 
unionize and bargain for the Euromedical workers, Unomedical dragged its feet but was 
finally persuaded by the Malaysian authorities and the Rubber Union to comply with 
the court’s award. 
In sum, the successful outcome of the industrial dispute was not primarily or only 
determined by the international campaign of the Danish labor NGO. It took 30 years 
getting the labor right approved! The result was secured by using the Malaysian indus-
trial system and civil judiciary that finally implemented the legislation correctly and 
approved the claim of the Malaysian industrial relations authorities and the industrial 
union against the claim of transnational capital and despite workers resorting to illegal 
industrial action in 2001. However, the Danish labor NGO campaign secured that the 
new corporation in charge of Euromedical did comply with the OECD code of conduct 
for TNCs instead of divesting its production in Malaysia as the former TNC did. The 
Danish trade unions did not intervene directly in favor of the Malaysian union. Instead, 
the peak union of LO closed down the labor NGO in 2006 claiming that it wanted to 
strengthen its international solidarity work. In reality, it eliminated an institution that 
enabled labor activists to engage in transnational union collaboration and empower-
ment and thus Danish LO reduced the space open for international grassroots solidarity 
work in Denmark!
The case of the Sri Lankan industrial dispute
At the time of the industrial dispute in Sri Lanka the Swedish TNC, Trelleborg AB, 
operated in 40 countries with a labor force of 22,000 employees (Egels-Zandén & 
Hyllman 2007). It was a global producer of industrial rubber items specialized in ad-
vanced polymer technology serving customers in aerospace, agriculture, automotive, 
transportation, and oil & gas worldwide. It had two tire plants in Sri Lanka with nearly 
700 employees, of which 250 were employed in the Biyagama Free Trade Zone where 
the dispute evolved. The Sri Lanka facility became Trelleborg’s global center for solid 
industrial tires during the 2000s (www.Trelleborg.com/en/The-Group/History/ accessed 
March 21, 2013).
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The Swedish TNC was guided by a code of conduct that secured minimum labor 
rights at its transplants around the world, including core international labor rights. Thus, 
it should be a matter of routine to recognize a new union organized in 2003 by employees 
at the Biyagama Free Trade Zone plant and affiliated to the Free Trade Zones & General 
Services Employees Union (FTZ&GSEU) that was constituted as a politically independent 
industrial union around the free trade zone, counted around 15,000 members, and affili-
ated to the global union, International Textile, Garment and Leather Workers’ Federation 
(ITGLWF). Yet, the local union’s communication to the Trelleborg subsidiary manage-
ment in 2004 fell on deaf ears. The union then approached its global union as well as the 
Swedish Industrial Workers’ Union (SIWU) and the NGO, Swedish Clean Clothes Cam-
paign (SCCC). A meeting was held in the free trade zone between the Sri Lanka industrial 
union and the Swedish corporation mediated by the labor authority of the free trade 
zone where the local management representative agreed to the recognition claim, but with-
out taking any action. On the contrary, the management tried to form an Employees’ 
Committee to circumvent the new union, but workers refused to join. 
Months later in early 2005, the regional management of Trelleborg’s Asian activities 
informed the local union and the industrial union that Trelleborg would not recognize 
the industrial union. Management threatened to exit Sri Lanka because the industrial 
union in its view had forced companies to close factories and relocate to China. A strike 
broke out when the bonus system was changed excluding irregular workers from the 
bonus wage. With the strike the global union intervened complaining to the Swedish 
headquarters and demanding that the lockout following the strike be terminated. The 
global union threatened to bring the case to the OECD for breaching the OECD code 
of conduct for multinationals. The Swedish industrial union contacted Trelleborg head-
quarters to make them comply with their corporate code of conduct. After a week, the 
subsidiary management in Sri Lanka called the workers back to work while suspending 
18 employees that were also local union activists. Workers refused to resume work in 
this situation. Once again the Swedish TNC backtracked and allowed all workers to 
return to work if they signed a letter of apology, yet under the condition that the letter 
would have no implication whatsoever. The local union agreed to these terms believing 
that the management with the deal recognized the union. 
In sum, the concerted international campaign of the local unions, the global union, 
and the Swedish unions made the Swedish TNC comply with its own code of con-
duct framed by the OECD code of conduct for TNCs. The global union had endorsed 
the Global Framework Agreement approach in 2001 and entered one with a Swedish 
TNC, IKEA (Miller 2004), but it had not concluded one with Trelleborg at the time 
of the industrial dispute in Sri Lanka. The global union had in fact started criticizing 
the code of conduct mechanism which had gained significant support by NGOs and 
international NGOs during the 1990s and translated, for example, the Swedish Clean 
Clothes Campaign from 1996 with the support of Swedish NGOs, national industrial 
unions, and garment retailers like Hennes & Mauritz (Ählström & Egels-Zandén 2008; 
Egels-Zandén & Hyllman 2006). The participating Swedish unions withdrew from the 
so-called ‘DressCode’ in 2002 which effectively stopped the multistakeholder TNC code 
of conduct project in Sweden. 
The campaign of the global union network against Trelleborg in Sri Lanka can be 
seen as a semicomprehensive campaign because it included a wild-cat strike in the focal 
company in the free trade zone of Sri Lanka and a global campaign against the corporate 
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HQs by the Global Union Federation and the home country industrial union. But the cam-
paign did not target the TNCs’ growth and profit centers through consumer campaigns 
for labor rights compliance boycotting Trelleborg’s products. Trelleborg had also focused 
its business on industrial rubber and polymer product manufacturing with few linkages to 
the global textile and garment industry. However, the Sri Lanka-based factories were key 
to one of Trelleborg’s global businesses, thus a corporate growth center, and Trelleborg 
strengthened its own code of conduct policy joining the UN Global Compact in 2007.
The case of the Turkish industrial dispute
Turkey-based die and metal sheet maker, Fontana Pietro Kalip, is a subsidiary of Italian 
TNC, Fontana Pietro, that is an engineering, die, and metal sheet corporation with two 
production plants in Italy and Turkey at the time of the industrial dispute in 2012–13 
(www.Fontana-group.com; accessed March 17, 2013). The Italian TNC is a component 
supplier of dies and metal sheets to the global automotive industry with key customers 
among the three German auto TNCs, BMW, Daimler Benz, and Volkswagen and Italian 
Ferrari. The Turkish subsidiary employed around 230 workers, of which Turkish indus-
trial union, Birlesik Metal Is (the United Metal Workers’ Union), had unionized the major-
ity in 2012 and applied the authorities for recognition as the legitimate union for Fontana 
Pietro Kalip workers. Discovering the organizing drive, the management dismissed four 
local union leaders and filed a court case against the Ministry of Labor. The Turkish indus-
trial union informed their global union federation, the newly formed IndustriALL, which 
included the global unions of metal workers and garment workers. The new global union 
called upon the Fontana Pietro Kalip management to reinstate the dismissed unionists 
and stop harassing the workers and recognize the union. IndustriALL also informed its 
two Italian metal industrial unions, FIM-CISL and FIOM-CGIL, that had members at the 
TNC’s home plant, and they complained to the Italian HQs. Finally, IndustriALL called 
upon assistance from their union members in the three Works Councils at BMW, Daimler, 
and Volkswagen to intervene based upon the Global Framework Agreements concluded 
between IndustriALL and the three German automobile corporations. Then, the Turkish 
subsidiary of Fontana Pietro withdrew its court case against the Turkish ministry and 
settled to recognize the union (IndustriALL Feb 28, 2013).
In sum, the mobilization of support by the Turkish industrial union from its global 
union federation that again coordinated a campaign to pressure the Italian subsidiary 
and HQs directly and indirectly through its key customers seemed to be enough to 
change the policy of the Italian TNC and comply with claim of the Turkish industrial 
union and the decision of the Turkish ministry. Thus, mobilizing its global union net-
work and targeting both the TNC HQs and key industrial customers of the TNC, the 
Turkish union and its allied unions conducted a comprehensive campaign and accom-
plished its objective without resorting to industrial actions like strikes or boycotts. 
Summing up
In the three clearly successful organizing campaigns, the key local actors were industrial 
unions and local workplace collectives, yet the type of industry varied (see Table 1). In 
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Table 1  Four cases of industrial disputes about unionizing and collective bargaining in foreign-affiliated 
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HQs = corporate headquarters. OECD NCP = OECD National Contact Point. CoC = Code of Conduct for TNCs. 
GFA = Global Framework Agreement. FTZ = Free Trade Zone. GUF = Global Union Federation (Global Union). 
IR = Industrial Relations. IMF = International Metalworkers Federation. EWC = European Works Council. CWA = First 
union in Toyota Motor Philippine Corporation. CLO = Second union in Toyota Motor Philippine Corporation.
these corporations the workforce of varying size had been internationalized to the point 
where around half of the corporate workforce were located in foreign countries relative 
to the HQs’ home country. Depending on the point of departure, the outcome of the 
dispute between the workers and the management at the Toyota assembling company in 
the Philippines is a failure (the first union) or a success (the second union), and from the 
workforce it must at last be considered a successful compromise facing one of the global 
automotive industry’s top 3 corporations during the 2000s. 
The labor campaigns undertaken did all involve cross-border collaboration and 
support, but the campaigns varied in regard to activities targeting global corporate cen-
ters of profit or growth. Thus, in the Philippines and Malaysia, the direct industrial 
actions (strike) or legal actions did not hurt any growth or profit centers, and when 
the global union was mobilized in the Philippine case it was unable to engage the core 
home country unions on the side of the first union in the Philippines. In Sri Lanka and 
Turkey, on the contrary, global unions and affiliated industrial unions in the home coun-
try of the TNCs were mobilized and intervened successfully. Only the Turkey-focused 
campaign can be classified as a comprehensive campaign because it targeted vulnerable 
relationships to key customers. Yet, the Sri Lanka-focused campaign did turn out to 
be a comprehensive campaign in practice because the traditional strike hit a corporate 
growth center. 
All in all, it is difficult to find a clear common social mechanism that explains the 
more or less effective and efficient outcomes by way of the labor campaign undertaken. 
In fact, both comprehensive and semicomprehensive campaigns elicited positive results. 
As claimed by Wills (1998), globalization does indeed open new opportunities for trans-
national union organizing and collective bargaining instead of only closing spaces for 
effective labor action. The question is how and why!
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Comparative case analysis and interpretation
Following the Global Labor Network approach, we shall link the workplace industrial 
dispute about union organizing and collective bargaining with two key forces. The first 
one is a potentially effective labor strategy based on the analysis of weak spots in the 
global value chains of the controlling TNC together with the embeddedness of the global 
corporate network in political or nonpolitical institutions. The second one is the match 
or mismatch of labor strategic power between an effective strategy and the capability 
of the focal worker collective/union and their alliance/coalition/network with labor and 
nonlabor partners as played out in the global labor campaign. Whether or not an ef-
fective labor strategy is available is a question of theoretical analysis of the actual and 
potential global labor networks relative to the existing corporate network, and whether 
it is implemented effectively and efficiently is a question of empirical analysis of the ac-
tual labor campaign relative to its theoretically established space of social mechanisms 
for potential collective action.
Let us start with the two cases that at first sight seem to validate the core proposi-
tion of the theory negatively (Philippines case as a failure) and positively (Turkey case of 
success). They are both situated in the global automotive industry, but the focal capital–
labor disputes are tied to a Northeast Asian motor vehicle producer (Toyota) and its 
operations in Southeast Asian and a European automotive component supplier (Fontana 
Pietro) with its foreign operations in the Middle East, respectively. 
Regarding the Philippine case, there is an obvious mismatch between the power of 
the globally founded, wealthy, and locally well-connected Japanese automaker and the 
power of its labor counterpart, that is a new and independent enterprise union based 
at Toyota’s affiliated plant in the Philippines and serving a market that had no strategic 
significance for Toyota as a profit or growth center in Southeast Asia in the early 2000s 
(Doner & Wad forthcoming). The Philippine enterprise union was supported by a Chris-
tian NGO but it realized after the clash with Toyota’s local management and its loss of 
its workplace base through mass dismissals that it had to ally with other metal work-
ers’ unions and the global union federation. Through its Christian network the dispute 
was transferred to Japan and carried on by Japanese NGOs and industrial unions. Its 
Japanese allies were unable to challenge Toyota in its home country through its enterprise 
union or the federation of enterprise unions in the automotive industry. Even the new 
OECD institution was not publicly pushed to take action persuading Toyota to comply 
with the code of conduct of OECD. The global union only called for a reinstatement of 
dismissed workers of Toyota’s affiliate in the Philippines and no direct industrial actions 
of solidarity were launched worldwide that could hit profit centers or growth centers in 
Thailand, China, Europe, or the United States. The Japanese metal workers’ unions have 
a strong position in the global union and especially in the Asia-Pacific region. All in all, 
the labor campaign was semicomprehensive forming a global labor network, but this 
network was not including the key unions and worker collectives in Japan and around 
the world, nor did it target and hit Toyota’s global growth or profit centers. 
Yet the global campaign might anyway have impacted Toyota’s union policy in the 
sense that corporation accepted an alternative enterprise union committed to respon-
sible and participatory union engagement in the Philippine assembling company. It is 
contested whether this second union was independent of the management and aimed 
to form an industrial union, but this was anyway claimed by its local union network 
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(Wad & Tackney 2011). The second union’s policy and practice was acceptable to 
Toyota and its home country enterprise union. 
The global campaign of the first union could not effectuate its cause of reinstate-
ment and union recognition, but ironically it opened up for a compromise. The en-
during dispute could eventually tarnish Toyota’s global reputation mediated by labor 
campaigning messages like ‘No. 1 Union Busting Corporation.’ A local solution was 
found as demanded by Toyota and its Japanese union. This solution complied with Phil-
ippine industrial relations law and the core international labor right at stake embodied 
in the second union and the concluded collective agreement. Whether any conceivable 
labor strategy could overcome Toyota’s resistance to a union that is considered unfit for 
Toyota’s participatory principles in the Toyota Production System is questionable. Even 
American unions have fought an uphill struggle to unionize Toyota’s transplants in the 
United States. And the second enterprise union achieved its objectives without undertak-
ing any global campaign but relating to domestic moderate metal workers’ unions and 
Toyota’s enterprise union! The conclusion is that no workers’ union would had been 
recognized if it had not been for the international campaign initiated by the first legiti-
mate enterprise union!
In the opposite end we have the Turkey case where the new and stronger global 
union (IndustriALL) was activated by the legally certified Turkish industrial union and 
coordinated a ‘global’ campaign that targeted the subsidiary’s TNC HQs in Italy and 
key customers in Germany. The campaign was transmitted by the Italian and German 
industrial unions, and it made use of the institutions of Global Framework Agreements 
and Works Councils to pressure the Italian TNCs’ value chain downstream. This cam-
paign worked very efficiently and effectively securing a positive outcome in terms of 
union recognition within half a year. The campaign can be said to be comprehensive at a 
global level bridging the North–South divide, and it delivered a prolabor result fast, thus 
testifying to the validity of the core propositions of the Global Labor Network theory.
The two other clear-cut successes of semicomprehensive campaigns require further 
analysis and eventual modification or deepening of the theory. These cases comprise 
TNC-controlled firms in industrial rubber/polymer product business with different mar-
kets (health services versus heavy transport equipment). The Malaysia case of Euro-
medical was for nearly 30 years a failure, but it turned out to become a success when 
the dispute was internationalized and the legal institutional process came to an end in 
Malaysia. The question is whether the domestic legal strategy of the Malaysian indus-
trial union proved effective independent of international union support, which would 
falsify the theory like the ‘second union win’ in the Philippines. This key question can be 
answered by addressing two subquestions: first, why did the labor authorities and the 
judiciary approve the quest of the Rubber Union in a political context of antiunionism? 
And second, why did the TNC stay on in Malaysia instead of divesting and leaving the 
country? 
The hypothesis is that the central Malaysian state and the Rubber Union were forced 
into an alliance because the union’s claim was right legally speaking and it was accorded 
legality by the authorities after two decades of legal battles. At the local state level of the 
confederation of the Malaysian state, the industrial relations authorities and judiciary 
might have given priority to foreign and local capital interests located in the area. When 
the central authorities finally agreed to the union certification issue, the authorities (and 
the union) were challenged by the TNC in the civil court system. After nearly 10 years, 
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the civil court system sided with the state and the union. The overruling of the TNC’s 
interest might have been facilitated not only by the legal validity of the union claim but 
also by the fact that the medical equipment industry was not a strategic important sector 
relative to the electronics export industry. Thus, the state did not incur (risks of) huge 
losses by foreign divestments. This risk had been high in the US-dominated electronics 
industry where the government did not allow the formation of a national industrial 
union of electronics workers since the early 1970s. The government finally agreed to 
legalize enterprise unions in the late 1980s and regional-based industrial unions in 2010, 
but not yet industrial unions (Wad 2012a). 
But why did the TNC comply with the award by the Federal Court and finally 
recognized the industrial union’s claim of representation? The controlling TNC of Eu-
romedical, the Nordic private equity company, did at the time of the ultimate judgment 
(2004) take a medium-term strategic growth interest in the Malaysian joint venture. 
This contrasted the former ‘owner,’ APM-Maersk, which decided divesting its manu-
facturing activities, including the Malaysian joint venture. Moreover, APM-Maersk di-
vested before the final award was given, and before the OECD code of conduct process 
had come to its conclusion. The new ‘owner’ agreed to follow the final judgment of the 
Malaysian judiciary, and did so in due time, but both corporations could have solved 
the issue out of court and accepted the claim of the Rubber Union. In sum, there were 
strategic corporate reasons for compliance in the end. 
Yet, the prolonged postponement of the core labor right was equal to the denial 
of this right for three decades. The victory of the Rubber Union and the Danish Labor 
NGO was a pyrrhic victory. It cost the Rubber Union a lot of money, and it probably 
added to the closing down of the Danish Labor NGO by its union owners. Only an 
extremely resilient workforce of mostly unskilled women carried the struggle to its suc-
cessful termination. Some even lost their jobs and were only compensated out of court 
after several years of negotiations. Along the way the industrial union underwent union 
policy battles and shift of leadership which reflected a learning process and dynamic ca-
pabilities of various labor groups. When a grassroots-oriented leadership was in power 
the union pursued a more international policy engaging the Danish labor NGO, and this 
relationship continued at grassroots levels when union leadership returned to the more 
legalistic minded persons. 
Comparing the Euromedical case story in Malaysia with the Trelleborg incident in 
Sri Lanka, the industrial dispute was resolved much faster in Sri Lanka than in Malaysia. 
In Malaysia, APM-Maersk did not comply at all but preferred to exit contrary to Trelle-
borg in Sri Lanka. One difference in corporate policy relates to the corporate stance on 
the OECD code of conduct. APM-Maersk did not have a policy following the OECD 
institution at that time. The Danish corporation only pursued a policy of Corporate 
Citizenship which is more about complying with the laws of the home and host coun-
tries and support society in an altruistic way. After the Malaysian incident—and other 
international incidents in Central America, Africa, and China—APM-Maersk decided 
to develop a corporate social responsibility policy and organizational capability in the 
wake of internal changes of corporate governance at top management level.
In the Sri Lanka case, the Swedish TNC, Trelleborg AB, had a code of conduct 
policy which became the key point of attack by the Sri Lankan and the Swedish indus-
trial unions and the global union. The Code of Conduct policy was not made redun-
dant by Sri Lankan industrial relations law. Yet, the TNC headquarters did not comply 
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immediately at the local and macroregional level. Corporate compliance took a week-
long strike and lockout in the Sri Lankan free trade zone. The Swedish TNC was thus by 
mismanagement hit directly in one of its core growth centers that supplied global indus-
tries and customers. It was simply too costly to continue a dispute that contradicted its 
strategic business interests, its declared labor policy (for home consumption in Sweden), 
and the legislation in the host country of operation! 
The demand of the Sri Lankan industrial union was accepted within a time span of 
1½ years. The result was effectuated by the combined global intervention of the global 
union federation, the TNC home country industrial union, and the local pressure by the 
host country union and the worker collective initiating a classic industrial action. The 
campaign of the global labor network was semicomprehensive in the sense that it did 
mobilize locally and globally but it did not target profit or growth centers of the TNC 
outside Sri Lanka. The Swedish TNC had rhetorically subscribed to the international la-
bor rights of ILO, including the right to organize and bargain collectively, but it had not 
strictly complied with this policy in developing countries. Thus, it faced loss of corporate 
reputation, public pressure by OECD and the Swedish public, and increasing problems 
servicing global customers. The dispute could even worsen if it did not resolve the strike 
in Sri Lanka and if the dispute triggered international sympathy actions coordinated by 
the global union. 
Summing up, we can say that a comprehensive campaign can be highly effective and 
efficient (Turkey case). However, prolabor results can be achieved fast even with semi-
comprehensive campaigns that emerge out of industrial contradictions in a particular 
growth or profit center of a TNC (Sri Lanka case). The paradoxical prolabor outcomes 
in Malaysia and the Philippines in the wake of semicomprehensive campaigns indicate 
that the fit between a labor organization’s code of conduct and its corporate counter-
part’s production system may enable a compromise allowing for labor organizing and 
collective bargaining (the Philippines), while the Malaysian outcome was available after 
enduring legal processing in an industry of marginal importance to the core political and 
economic elite in Malaysia. 
Thus, globalization seems to open new avenues for international labor networking 
and campaigning that can provide positive results in terms of workplace organizing of 
TNC affiliates in developing countries. The combined forces of cross-border labor net-
working based on local workplace decisiveness and national industrial union support 
can nowadays link up with global unions and/or industrial unions and works councils in 
TNC home countries. This joined pressure can push TNC management to comply with 
global framework agreements or publicly declared TNC own codes of conduct, OECD 
standards, or core ILO international labor rights. 
On the other hand, cross-border horizontal workplace networking between worker 
collectives did not seem to affect the outcomes, maybe except in the Philippine case. 
Strong horizontal intra-corporate labor networks did not exist in the four cases! Why? 
Three explanations are possible. Firstly, corporate employment structures of the focal 
TNCs were less internationalized than expected. A fairly equal mix of ‘home’ and ‘for-
eign’ employees makes the home country workforce outnumber other countries’ specific 
workforces. This feature may weaken the overall inclination of employees to form and 
develop intra-corporate cross-border workplace labor networks. 
Secondly, as argued by Schiller (2013, 272–274), the strengths of the home country 
unions in the Global North determine the level of international solidarity. If the 
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Northern unions can govern their home affairs pretty well, they will not necessarily 
encourage their member unions and worker collectives in direct North–South solidar-
ity actions as seen in the cases from Denmark and Japan. They may allow union-based 
labor NGOs to carry out international solidarity work, but such NGO platforms may 
also get out of central union control and union leaders will often react downgrading 
or abandoning them in times of union problems (Danish case). Union hierarchy is 
sustained.
Thirdly, trade unions have been constituted as national organizations, and they have 
over time built an international network that is supposed to handle cross-border issues. 
This formalized international union collaboration has been strengthened in the post-
Cold War era with the merger of union confederations and international trade secre-
tariats. Global unions have also promoted global framework agreements with TNCs as 
a means to secure core international labor rights. The drawback is that this progress in 
global union bargaining power is primarily recognized among European TNCs based in 
countries with coordinated market systems. Path dependence prevails.
Conclusion and limitations
The main question addressed in the paper is how labor can leverage effective power 
against management of global corporate networks? This question was split into two 
subquestions and analyses, one focusing on theory development, the other on empirical 
validation and theory adjustment. In order to conclude retroductively we combine the 
results of these two kinds of analysis in the following way. 
A Global Labor Network perspective was theoretically outlined that can explicate 
strategic labor power countering global corporate networks and pressuring corporate 
decision-makers to comply with labor objectives—at least as long as the demands do 
not threaten corporate strategy for global profitability. The theory of Global Labor Net-
work is eclectic based on four propositions from the extant literature that is integrated 
in a general proposition about union strategic power in global corporate network. The 
theory can now be qualified. 
Comprehensive campaigning can be sufficient to create the wanted outcome 
(Turkey case), but it is not necessary in the sense that semicomprehensive campaigns 
can also accomplish the objective (cases of Malaysia, Philippines, Sri Lanka). Labor 
campaigning is not always informed by a global labor perspective and thus it may 
overlook strategic opportunities mobilizing and leveraging labor power at weak posi-
tions of the corporate counterpart. Although the Danish labor NGO used innovative 
methods, it did not realize that the retail company of APM-Maersk was a cash cow 
that could be targeted through a labor NGO-staged consumer boycott by Danish 
consumers. 
The learning process of labor campaigning is important as successful collective ac-
tion often takes time and requires adjustments along the way. Companies and the focal 
workplace of the industrial dispute can shift position within corporate value chains 
due to international mergers and acquisitions. Such shifts can change the bargaining 
relations between labor and management in a prolabor direction when the workplace 
graduates from a redundant position to a growth position (Malaysia case) or vice versa 
(the Philippines). 
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The lead firms of the global industry and value chain are important targets of cross-
border labor action. Lead firms with code of conducts including international standards 
of labor rights are more responsive and vulnerable to international campaigns (Sri Lanka 
case) than other firms, although corporate reputation may matter as does domestic ju-
diciary institutions (Malaysia and the Philippines). But lead firms will often neglect en-
abling international labor rights until they risk corporate reputation and profitability. 
Basically, labor faces employer decision-making, which ultimately depends on ownership 
and control in global corporate networks.
Along the process of campaigning local worker collectives and domestic unions 
will have to scale up and down their campaign. Depending on the circumstances, local 
labor networks must become national and international in order to win, and they can 
also shift arena from industrial relations to civilian judiciaries and back again (Malaysia 
case). But scaling down and switching path of union approach can be necessary if the 
corporate counterpart will not bow to the union policy on labor–management relation-
ship allowing space for a new union (Philippine case).
Finally, building and sustaining strategic labor power is a time-consuming process 
that must explore strategic opportunities in the global corporate network of operation 
on the one hand and secure labor capacity and dynamic capability through global labor 
networking on the other hand. However, this labor power must match the power of 
management in global corporate networks as well as the opportunities and obstacles of 
the political–judiciary system domestically (all four cases). In terms of time efficiency, 
the mobilization of global unions shortened the industrial conflict (cases of Philippines, 
Sri Lanka, and Turkey) relative to the dispute supported by a foreign labor NGO only 
(Malaysia case), but the most rapid effect was generated by the global union that had 
global framework agreements with important customers of the focal corporation (Turkey 
case). In the ineffective intervention by a global union (the Philippine case), no global 
framework agreement was in play with the key corporation. Nor did the corporation 
subscribe to OECD Codes of Conduct for compliance with core international labor stan-
dards. In the Sri Lanka case the opposite dynamic prevailed. Pressure from the local 
workplace collective, its industrial union, and the relevant global union elicited TNC 
compliance. The TNC’s international reputation was questioned due to its noncompli-
ance with its own code of conduct. In the Malaysia case of 30 years of union denial no 
global union was mobilized, and the successful outcome relied on domestic legal and 
international voluntary institutions for labor rights compliance.
Thus, the overall conclusion is that the adequate combination of global labor ca-
pabilities and global labor strategizing into strategic labor power can match corporate 
power in a global market economy in many situations, but some may require radical 
changes of the worker collective and union policy (Philippine case). Comprehensive labor 
campaigns can do the job, and even semicomprehensive campaigns can deliver but less 
efficiently. Traditional campaigns may even be part of the equation if they hit vulnerable 
points of corporate growth, profit, or reputation. Surprisingly, transnational workplace 
labor networks have not been a strong component of the ‘winning’ formula in our cases. 
Prolabor results have primarily been achieved within a national or international union 
framework rooted in coordinated market economies. Yet, all our TNCs tried at first to 
avoid having their particular affiliates unionized! 
The validity of the present analysis is limited in various ways. Firstly, the embryonic 
forms of global union networks of workplaces within particular global corporations 
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have not been analyzed through primary data generation, and the most effective labor 
campaign is only partially researched (Turkey case). Secondly, the internal differences 
among labor groups across scale and time have been downplayed, although they may 
reflect learning processes among labor factions and constituencies (Philippine and 
Malaysia cases). Thirdly, the dynamic capabilities and strategies of global corporations 
to counter global labor campaigns have not been considered in any detail. Fourthly, the 
multiple-case comparison includes corporations in transition from national to trans-
national workforces with around 50% foreign employees. Finally, only ‘positive’ out-
come cases are considered, not clearly negative ones. Case studies of transnationalized 
corporate workforces and industrial disputes including negative outcome cases should 
be included in future research aiming to assess the validity and appropriateness of 
the Global Labor Network approach to issues of international solidarity actions in the 
21st century.
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